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In this paper, we aim at testing whether press conferences held after the meeting
of the ECB’s monetary policy council steer market short- and long-term interest rates
in the euro zone. To meet this goal, we "codify" the statements according to whether
they are neutral, hawkish, or dovish. We show, using a principal components anal-
ysis of euro-zone (short- and long-term) interest rates that the euro-zone’s market
rates react signiﬁcantly to the bias in statements, and more particularly to changes in
statements from one meeting to the next. If we study separately the reaction of short-
and long-term interest rates to changes in statements, the short end of the yield curve
reacts more sharply to statements than the long segment. We show that the eﬀect
of statements peaks on interest rates with a maturity of six or twelve months and is
smaller for the longer maturities. Using non-parametric tests conﬁrms our previous
results.
JEL classiﬁcation : E58, E52, E43
Keywords : Communication, Transparency, Monetary Policy, European Central Bank.
Résumé
Ce papier a pour objectif d’évaluer si les conférences de presse tenues à l’issue du
conseil de politique monétaire de la Banque Centrale Européenne orientent les taux
d’intérêt du marché en zone euro. Pour cela, nous "codons" les discours suivant
l’information qu’ils contiennent concernant l’évolution future du taux directeur de la
BCE : discours neutre, "dur" (hawkish) ou accommodant (dovish). Nous montrons
que les taux d’intérêt réagissent signiﬁcativement à la tonalité du discours, et plus
particulièrement à l’évolution du discours d’un conseil de politique monétaire à l’autre.
En outre, la partie courte de la courbe des taux réagit plus fortement aux discours
que la partie longue : nous trouvons en eﬀet que l’impact des discours est maximal
sur les taux de maturité six et douze mois.
∗ marie.musard@univ-orleans.fr, Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orléans (UMR 6586), University of Orleans
mgies@ixis-cib.com, IXIS Corporate and Investment Bank.
† I would like to thank Patrick Artus and Florence Beranger for their many valuable comments and
suggestions.1 Introduction
An extensive stream of the literature has measured the impact of monetary policy decisions
on the yield curve. Nevertheless, the way those studies are conducted has evolved a lot
in the last decade in a context of enhanced transparency of central banks. In order to
highlight the importance of this topic, we have to recall that central banks can directly
aﬀect only one short-term interest rate through their monetary policy instruments. How-
ever, consumption and investment decisions are to a large extent inﬂuenced by longer-term
yields, such as mortgage rates and corporate bond rates, and on the prices of long-lived
assets, such as housing and equities. This is where assessing the impact of monetary policy
decisions on the yield curve is important. Now, we will detail the evolution on those studies
in the last years.
The ﬁrst paper to assess markets’ reaction to monetary policy actions is Cook & Hahn
(1989), who examined the one-day response in the United States of bond rates to changes
in the target Fed funds rate from 1974 through 1979. Their procedure was to regress the
change in the bill, note and bond rates on the change in the target Fed funds rate. Their
sample consists only of the days in which the Fed changed the Fed Funds target rate. The
response to target rate increases was positive and signiﬁcant at all maturities, but smaller
at the long end of the yield curve : a one percentage point increase in the Fed funds target
led to an increase of ﬁfty-ﬁve basis points in the three-month T-bill rate, but only a ten
basis point increase in the 30-year bond yield. Results for more recent periods show a
much weaker relationship between target rate changes and other interest rates. For exam-
ple, in applying the Cook and Hahn event-study approach to the 1987-1995 period, Roley
& Sellon (1995) found that the bond rate rose a statistically insigniﬁcant four basis points
for each percentage point change in the target funds rate. Similarly weak results for the
1989-1992 period were obtained by Radecki & Reinhart (1994). Therefore, can we account
for the apparent deterioration of the relationship between target rate changes and market
interest rates in the 1990s ? Actually, in recent years, the general move in central banks
to enhance their transparency has had as a consequence to improve substantially the pre-
dictability of monetary policy decisions. Thus, target rate changes have been more widely
anticipated in recent years, and this squares with the Roley and Sellon (1995) observation
that interest rates rose somewhat in advance of target rate increases. Bond prices set in
forward-looking markets should respond only to the surprise element of monetary policy
actions, and not to anticipated movements in the funds rate. That’s why Kuttner (2001)
2has perfected the approach of Cook et Hahn, using the Fed Funds Futures to identify the
expected and the unexpected component of the monetary policy decision. Once identiﬁed,
it estimates the response of market rates to the anticipated and unanticipated changes in
the Fed funds target, and documents the much stronger relationship between market rates
and unexpected changes in the funds rate target.
At the same time, several papers document the extent to which U.S. monetary policy
has become increasingly open and transparent and how these moves toward greater open-
ness and transparency had increased the ability of markets to anticipate policy actions.
Thus, Poole & Rasche (2000) and Poole, Rasche & Thornton (2002) investigate the ex-
tent to which market participants anticipate Federal Reserve policy actions. Their most
important ﬁnding is that not only is the market better able to anticipate funds rate tar-
get changes, but it appears that the market is able to anticipate such changes further in
advance. In more recent papers, Lange, Sack & Whitesell (2003) and Swanson (2004)
conclude that a higher degree of transparency of the Fed is connected with a higher degree
of predictability. In the euro area, Perez-Quiros & Sicilia (2002) ﬁnd that market inter-
est rates have predicted euro area interest rates comparatively well up to three months
in advance. According to their approach, over the period between 4 January 1999 and 6
June 2002, which included 78 meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB, the market
correctly anticipated 94% of the decisions. Moreover, Bernoth & von Hagen (2004) who
analyze the impact of ECB monetary policy decisions on the volatility of the Euribor fu-
tures rates, conclude that the policy decisions of the ECB have been on average predictable
and by and large the communication strategy with the market has worked surprisingly well
for a relatively new institution. These authors demonstrate that, since May 2001, markets
were not surprised by the decisions on the rates of the ECB1.
Transparency of monetary policy allows ﬁnancial markets to better anticipate the mea-
sures being implemented by the central bank. As a result, the response of interest rates
to the publication of macroeconomic data depends on the degree of transparency in the
conduct of monetary policy. When ﬁnancial markets properly understand the factors that
aﬀect inﬂation, how the central bank evaluates them and the steps it will likely take to
deal with them, interest rates should instantly adjust to the information provided by new
1In this regard, the decision of the Governing Council of the ECB in November 2001 to switch from
bimonthly to monthly discussion of monetary policy may have aﬀected the predictability of the ECB, as
the timing of its interest changes can be anticipated more easily by the market.
3macroeconomic data. The theory of eﬃcient markets predicts that the prices of ﬁnancial
instruments will always reﬂect all available information. If markets are eﬃcient, interest
rates should adjust virtually instantaneously after the release of data that modify ﬁnan-
cial markets’ expectations concerning monetary policy. Transparency thus cause ﬁnancial
markets to adjust their interest rate expectations as soon as macroeconomic data are pub-
lished, in advance of any action by the central bank. In this vein, Haldane & Read (2000)
show that a reduction in the markets’ uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction func-
tion implies that market prices will react less to monetary policy changes since market
participants are better able to anticipate them. This implies that the markets’ better
knowledge of the central bank’s reaction function causes the markets to react more fully to
news about the state of the economy, in particular macroeconomic data releases on which
the reaction function is (in part) conditioned. Consequently, markets react to macroeco-
nomic announcements they view as important arguments to the monetary policy reaction
function and, moreover, react more strongly to those unanticipated data releases that have
greater impact on potential future monetary policy. Thus, in a world where the central
bank’s reaction function was known to the market participants with certainty, one would in
principle observe no ﬁnancial asset price reactions at the time of monetary policy changes,
but signiﬁcant reactions to the release of surprise macroeconomic data that occur before
the monetary policy action date.
Insofar as monetary policy decisions are now largely predictable and consequently well
expected, one can wonder what role is played by central banks in the implementation of
monetary policy if the ﬁnancial markets are themselves able to digest and factor in new
information into interest rates. Have central banks the possibility to make monetary policy
more eﬀective ? Transparency helps ﬁnancial markets better anticipate monetary policy
decisions and thus cause ﬁnancial markets to adjust their interest rate very quickly and
well before the meeting of monetary policy. However, can central banks go beyond in
moving asset prices in the desired direction ? The recent behavior of long rates highlight
the importance of communication as a tool of monetary policy from the role played by
Fed’s statements on the day of the FOMC meeting. "It’s not what they do, it’s what they
say": this was the sort of thing one could read in 20042. Thus, the statement that followed
the 28 January 2004 meeting led to "record" reactions in the Treasuries market: two- and
ﬁve-year interest rates rose 21 and 25 bp, respectively, in the half hour that followed the
2Statements reported by Bernanke (2004b).
4announcement. This excessive reaction was triggered by what the Fed had said, and not
by what it had done: indeed, the decision to leave interest rates unchanged was perfectly
expected by the ﬁnancial markets, but the FOMC’s decision to delete the sentence "policy
accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period" and replace it by "the Com-
mittee believes it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation" was interpreted
by the ﬁnancial markets as a signal that the Fed was going to tighten its monetary policy
faster than what had been previously anticipated. This is why we need to study the impact
of statements in addition to the monetary policy decision to explain asset prices’ reactions.
In this paper, we aim at testing whether the statement made during the press confer-
ence that follows the announcement of the ECB’s decision about the key intervention rate,
for its part, has an impact on interest rates. To do so, we are going to look whether the
tone of the ECB’s statement (which we are going to codify) or the change in the tone from
the previous statement explains changes in the euro zone’s short- and long-term interest
rates. Before proceeding to this empirical studies, we explain in the following section, why
central bank communication is so important and, by guiding market expectations, helps
to make monetary policy more eﬀective. Then, we brieﬂy review, in section 3, empirical
studies on central bank communication. Section 4 then discusses the issue of how to mea-
sure communication. This is followed by our empirical analysis of the eﬀectiveness of ECB
statements in inﬂuencing euro-zone interest rates in the desired way in section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2 Communication and eﬀectiveness of monetary policy :
the role of monetary policy expectations
In this section, we underline the usefulness of central bank communication as a mean of
informing the policy expectations of ﬁnancial markets, and in ﬁne making monetary policy
more eﬀective. We already mentioned that the ECB directly aﬀects only one very short-
term whereas most private-sector borrowing and investment decisions depend on longer-
term rates. So, what is the link between short-term interest rate (controlled by the central
bank) and longer-term rates, such as Treasury bond yields ? The earlier studies quoted in
the introduction ﬁnd a positive relationship between target rate changes and other interest
rates. In other words, a tightening of monetary policy is generally followed by an increase
of long-term rates whereas an easing of monetary policy is followed by a decrease of interest
5rates. However, the link between long-term rates and the policy rate of the central bank
can be quite loose at times 3. For example, in the United States, although the FOMC
has raised its target for the federal funds rate by 75 basis points in its three meetings sine
June 2004, the yield on ten-year Treasury securities has fallen by almost the same amount
during that period. Can we account for this unusual recent movement in long-term yields ?
Basic ﬁnancial theory implies that a link does exist between short-term interest rates and
longer-term rates. The connection between the oﬃcial policy rate and long term interest
rates operates less through the current values of the policy rate, however than through
the interest-rate actions that the central bank is expected to take in the future. Con-
sequently, expectations about monetary policy are at least as important as the current
level of short-term interest rates in terms of determining long-term interest rates (theory
of expectations). So, with risk and term premiums held constant, long-term yields move
closely with the expectations that ﬁnancial market hold about the future evolution of the
policy rate. For example, if short-term interest rates are expected to be high on average
over the relevant period, then long term rates will tend to be high as well. Likewise, if
futures short-term interest rates are expected to be low on average, then long-term rates
will tend to be low.
Finally, the level of short-term policy rate provides at best only partial information about
the overall tightness or ease of monetary conditions. What matters especially in the deter-
mination of the long rates are the private-sector expectations of the future policy actions.
But how are expectations about the future path of the policy rate formed ? We under-
stand here the role played by the communication of the central bank. Indeed, thanks to
its communication, the central bank is going to be able to give its interpretation as for the
evolution of the economic activity (growth, inﬂation) allowing ﬁnancial markets to form
expectations about the future policy rate. So, the more the central bank provides infor-
mation about its way to forecast the evolution of the inﬂation, or of real activity, the more
expectations of ﬁnancial markets and central bank will tend to converge and ﬁnally, the
more the central bank will inﬂuence long-term rates4.
Several Fed governors’ interventions, such as Bernanke (2004a), Bernanke (2004b) or Kohn
3Bernanke (2004b).
4Naturally, we can add that markets will take into account the information provided by the central
bank only if this latter beneﬁts from certain credibility on markets.
6(2005) emphasize the role of central banks communication, insofar as communication leads
to a better eﬀectiveness of the monetary policy5. For Bernanke, it is of utmost impor-
tance that central banks reveal a maximum of information to markets concerning their
own forecast for future economic outlook, growth and inﬂation and even target of long-
term inﬂation, in order to improve the long-run predictability of monetary policy6.B e f o r e
turning to our analysis, we brieﬂy review, in section 3, empirical papers related to the
communication of central banks.
3 Literature on central bank communication : empirical
studies
The empirical papers aiming at estimating the eﬀect of central banks communication on
asset prices (yield curve, equity prices, exchange rates) are recent and are mainly focused
on Fed speeches. However, references related to theoretical models estimating the impact
of communication are older and numerous. Our objective here is not to supply an exhaus-
tive list of all these papers7. Theoretical papers dealing with central banks communication,
and more generally with central banks transparency do not provide a well-deﬁned answer:
indeed, according to the transparency dimension considered (on the economic model, on
forecasts, on preferences of the central bank...) and according to the way of modelling the
economy (neoclassic versus neokeynesian Phillips’ curve) conclusion diverges.
Concerning empirical work on central bank communication, the literature is still quite
small, partly reﬂecting the diﬃculty of measuring it and partly due to the relatively recent
adoption of transparency as a major characteristic of central bank policy. Here we focus on
the impact of central banks communication on the yield curve. Nevertheless, some papers
5Some theoretical papers (Amato, Morris & Shin (2002) and Morris & Shin (2002)) conclude on the
contrary that too much public information (that is information provided by the central bank) is detrimental
to welfare. Speciﬁcally, the greater the precision of the agents’ private information, the more likely it is that
increased provision of public information lowers social welfare. The detrimental eﬀect of public information
arises from the fact that agents overreact to public information, placing too much weight on the public
signal relative to weights that would be used by the social planner (here the central bank).
6Bernanke (2004a) distinguishes between short-run and long-run predictability of policy. Short-run
predictability for Bernanke focuses on monetary policy actions over short horizons whereas long-run pre-
dictability focuses on the ability of the public to forecast policies at long horizons.
7We can refer to surveys on the transparency : the most recent is Carpenter (2004), other surveys are
those of Geraats (2002), and Hahn (2002).
7analyze the eﬀect of communication on exchange rates : Jansen & de Haan (2003) ﬁnd
some eﬀect from ECB statements on the volatility of the euro and Fratzscher (2004) ﬁnds
more systematic evidence in favor of eﬀectiveness for the three G3 monetary authorities in
changing the level and volatility in the desired direction.
Other papers study the market reaction to speeches of central banks. The ﬁrst article
to analyze the eﬀect of Fed communication on market rates is Kohn & Sack (2003). These
authors use daily data and show that when Fed holds a speech (statements which can
be three types of communication : statements by the FOMC Chairman Greenspan on
the day of the FOMC meeting, testimonies and other speeches of Greenspan), then mar-
ket rates variance (which corresponds to the volatility of the error term in regressions)
is much stronger. This suggests that ﬁnancial markets react to statements delivered by
the Fed. Furthermore, Kohn and Sack distinguish two types of statements, one referring
to the monetary policy inclination and the second one to the economic outlook. These
authors conclude that statements by Greenspan about the monetary policy inclination has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the volatility of short-term interest rates while statements about the
economic outlook tend to have a signiﬁcant impact on longer maturities. In the same vein,
Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack (2004) and Gürkaynak, Sack & Swanson (2004) ﬁnd that US
ﬁnancial markets attribute considerable importance to statements that include an indica-
tion about the future path of policy.
Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004) analyze the communication strategies and assess their ef-
fectiveness for three central banks : the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB. They
focus on forward-looking policy statements (speeches, interviews and testimonies)delivered
by all policy-makers (not only central bank’s governor) distinguishing communication on
meeting days from inter-meeting statements. Following the terminology also used by Kohn
& Sack (2003), these authors decided to keep the categorization as simple as possible.
They conclude that US markets react signiﬁcantly stronger to statements by Greenspan
and less to statements by other FOMC members, whereas euro area markets respond to
communication by the ECB President and other Governing council members to a very sim-
ilar extent. Finally, they ﬁnd that US markets react to statements both about monetary
policy inclination and the economic outlook, whereas UK and euro area markets respond
mostly only to communication about monetary policy8.
8This diﬀerence likely reﬂects, according to Ehrmann and Fratzscher, the diﬀerent market perceptions
of policy reaction functions.
84 Measuring communication : how do we "codify" the
statements made at the ECB’s press conferences ?
In this section, we turn to the issue of how to measure communication. We have already
underlined that the literature concerning empirical work on central bank communication
is quite small, reelecting the diﬃculty of measuring it. Our objective is to test whether the
statement made during the press conference that follows the announcement of the ECB’s
decision about the oﬃcial policy rate, has an impact on euro-zone short-term and long-term
interest rates. To do so, we are going to look whether the tone of the ECB’s statement
(which we are going to codify) or the change in the tone from the previous statement
explains changes in the euro zone’s short- and long-term interest rates. Our study, which
bears on the euro zone, therefore is based on the following hypothesis : we suppose here
that the monetary policy decision is widely expected by the markets, and consequently
the relevant short- and long-term interest rates do not react to the ECB’s announcement
about interest rates. This hypothesis is largely consistent with studies quoted in the intro-
duction 9 who conclude that monetary policy decisions of the ECB have been on average
predictable. In other words, markets were not surprised by the decisions on the rates of
the ECB (in particular since May 2001).
Contrary to Kohn & Sack (2003) and Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004) who distinguish be-
tween monetary policy inclination statements and economic outlook statements, we have
codiﬁed all the statement made at press conferences from 1999 to October 2004 (i.e. a
statement per month generally speaking) by drawing a distinction between statements
with a "hawkish" (that is, statements that seemed to indicate that future policies might
involve higher rates than previously thought), "very hawkish", "neutral", "dovish" or "very
dovish" tone. A variable we call statement code variable thus takes the values + 2, + 1, 0,
- 1 and - 2 according to the tone of the statement (Table 1). A study of Gerlach (2004) is
based on the same codifying principle applied to the editorial of the ECB monthly bulletin.
However, unlike our statement code variable that summarizes all the information into a
single value, Gerlach allocates a diﬀerent value to three dimensions : inﬂation, real activity
and M310.
9Perez-Quiros & Sicilia (2002), Bernoth & von Hagen (2004) and lately Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004).
10We compared our codiﬁcation of statements with that carried of Gerlach (2004). We take the sum of
the ratings set by Gerlach or calculate a weighted average (with larger weight for "activity" and "inﬂation"
ratings, i.e. 40% than for the rating relative to M3, i.e. 20%). We conclude that our assessment of ECB
9At each press conference, the ECB discusses the prospects with respect to how prices will






Table 1: Codes reﬂecting the tone of the statements
trend in the medium term (as its main objective is medium-term price stability) via sev-
eral dimensions : it analyzes and directly anticipates trends in consumer prices (moves in
energy prices, prices of food goods, wages, etc.) but also in real activity (insofar as robust
growth can go hand in hand, in the long term, with inﬂationary pressures) and in the
money supply via growth in monetary aggregate M3. In its statement, the ECB therefore
presents its inﬂation and growth scenarii, as well as the implicit (upside or downside) risks
for its central scenarii. It is by drawing on these scenarii and associated risks that we as-
cribe a "rating" to the statement (for example, a scenario of growth equal to its potential
with upside risks and a rise in inﬂation and with also upside risks in the medium term will
be deemed very hawkish). The codiﬁcation stems from our interpretation of the ECB’s
statements, it is therefore subjective by deﬁnition.
A noteworthy point is that the structure of the press conference changed from May 2003
onwards. From 1999 to April 2003, risks weighing on medium-term price stability were
analyzed by drawing on the two pillars (pillar one : trends in M3 and pillar two : a col-
lection of indicators having an impact on prices). Subsequently, from May 2003 onwards,
the two pillars were replaced by economic analysis and monetary analysis. This does not
modify, however, our codifying work. The codiﬁcation we obtain is presented in Appendix
1 (Table 3). In this study, we have drawn on the records of press conferences found on the
ECB’s web site. We can see that no press conference is held in August. Furthermore, two
press conferences were held in March and October 2000, and this explains why there were
thirteen press conferences in 2000 instead of eleven in the other years.
statements is quite similar to the one drawn upon by Gerlach, especially when we look at the weighted
average of his ratings. The only major diﬀerence concerns 2004, when ECB statements where relatively
hawkish in our opinion, while he deems them to have been neutral.
10Note that the tone of ECB statements (Appendix 1, Table 2) is more often hawkish than
accommodating even though in four out of the six years of observation, growth in the euro
zone was lower than its potential growth rate (for the ECB, potential growth is close to
2-2.25%). Simultaneously, the inﬂation target has exceeded 2% every year except in 1999
(and inﬂation is the objective of the ECB’s monetary policy).
5 Results : market reactions to ECB communication
We now turn to the question whether ECB statements inﬂuence ﬁnancial markets by mov-
ing market interest rates. We aim at testing whether moves in short- and long-term interest
rates between the day of the ECB’s meeting and the day before the meeting, are related
to the tone of the statement : hawkish, very hawkish, neutral, dovish or very dovish.
The studies conducted in the United States and reviewed in our introduction use intraday
data and, therefore, assess the impact of the Fed’s statement in the minutes just after
the statement11. We use daily data since our objective is to test whether the statements
have a durable impact on interest rates. It is normal that the markets should react to
a macroeconomic ﬁgure or a statement : consequently, asset prices move in the wake of
announcements. However, what we would like to ascertain, is whether the initial reaction
lasts a few hours and is always factored into interest rates at the end of the day. To do so,
we calculate, for each interest rate we consider, the diﬀerence between the interest rate on
the day of the monetary policy council meeting and the interest rate on the day before the
Governing Council meets (closing price). This ascertains the impact of the ECB meeting
on interest rates. For each ECB meeting (66 were held between January 1999 and Octo-
ber 2004) and for each interest rate we consider, we calculate the diﬀerence between the
interest rate the day of the Governing council meeting and the day before the meeting.
What euro-zone interest rates do we consider? We want to analyze the impact of the
ECB’s statements on the euro-zone’s short- and long-term interest rates. We have there-
fore chosen to focus on several money market rates, in other words the 1-month Euribor,
3-month Euribor, 6-month Euribor and 12-month Euribor spot rates . With respect to
long-term interest rates for the euro zone, we draw on German contracts (which are the
benchmark of the euro-zone yield curve), 2-year (Schatz), 5-year (Bobl) and 10-year (Bund)
rates. The interest of working on contracts (for the long segment) rather than spot rates
lies in the fact that, generally speaking, futures are far more reactive (and thus factor in
11Only Kohn & Sack (2003) use daily data.
11any additional information far faster)12. We propose two methodologies : ﬁrst, the com-
monly used dummy variable regression approach in the event-study literature. And then,
we perform non-parametric tests in order to test the robustness of our previous results.
5.1 A dummy variable regression approach
In the event-study literature, authors generally regress the change in asset prices on the
change of oﬃcial policy rate. The sample consists only on days of central banks’ meetings.
∆ Rt = α + β ∆ kt + εt (1)
where ∆ Rt stands for the change in asset prices and ∆ kt stands for the change in mone-
tary policy rate.
In the introduction of this paper, we mentioned the evolution of the way those event-
studies are conducted. Thus, Cook & Hahn (1989), ∆ kt stands for the change in the Fed
Funds target rate. Then, in Kuttner (2001) , ∆ kt stands for the monetary policy surprise,
i.e. the unexpected component of the monetary policy decision. Finally, in a context of
enhanced transparency of central banks, as long as monetary policy decisions are perfectly
expected, a surprise on the day of the monetary policy meeting is no longer provided by
the decision about intervention rates. Consequently, ∆ kt tends to be null. This is why we
need to study, on days of policy meetings, the eﬀect of statements to explain the reactions
of interest rates. We propose to estimate now the following equation :
∆ Rt = α + βD ECB + εt (2)
where DECB stands for our statement code variable.
We carry out a Principal Component Analysis on the series of changes in interest rates
(centered and reduced daily diﬀerences for 1M-Euribor, 3M-Euribor, 6M-Euribor, 12M-
Euribor, Schatz, Bobl and Bund) to obtain "summarized" information about general moves
in interest rates around the date of the statement. PCA consists in projecting the n daily
changes in the interest rates we consider (euro-zone short- and long-term interest rates)
on the basis of n vectors (orthogonal with one another). Centering and reducing data
prevent the more volatile series from "crushing" the estimate. Furthermore, this enables
us to interpret the relative weight of each interest rate in the axes derived from our PCA
(via the correlations).
12For futures contracts, we use the continuous series calculated by Datastream that interpolates, accord-
ing to their volume, the two closest contracts.
125.1.1 Interest rates react far more to the change in the tone from one state-
ment to the next than to the statement in absolute terms
Initially, we carry out a PCA on all interest rates (short- and long-term interest rates),
then we subsequently carry out a PCA on short-term interest rates exclusively and then
long-term interest rates. When we carry out the PCA of changes in short- and long-term
interest rates, we obtain a ﬁrst factor that explains 52% of the variance of all the changes in
short- and long-term interest rates. This factor is well linked to all the changes in short- and
long-term interest rates : the correlations range between 0.30 and 0.37 which means that
the series are weighted in a virtually identical manner in this ﬁrst factor. Consequently,
this ﬁrst factor satisfactorily represents the common moves in short- and long-term interest
rates in the euro zone.
We now estimate via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) the relationship between the ﬁrst
factor derived from our PCA and our variable that codiﬁes the statement between -2 and
+2. We call this latter variable statement code variable and we note it DECB.T h ee s t i m a -
tion obtained is presented in appendix 2 (table 4)13. We can see from this estimation that
our codiﬁcation variable is signiﬁcant : the ECB’s statements therefore do have an impact
on the euro-zone’s short- and long-term interest rates as they result from the main com-
ponent. Regarding the sign of the coeﬃcient of our statement code variable, it is positive,
and this clearly means that when the statements are hawkish (codes +1 or +2), short-
and long-term interest rates tend to rise and, vice-versa, when the statements are dovish
(codes -1 or -2), interest rates tend to decrease. Conversely, the explanatory power is rel-
atively low. We then seek to improve the estimate by proposing a variant of our variable
that codiﬁes ECB statements : we build a new variable that reﬂects changes in the ECB
statement’s tone in comparison with the tone of the previous month.
The new variable of statement code is introduced in our equation :
∆ Rt = α + β ∆ DECB + εt (3)
where ∆ DBCE stands for the change in the ECB’s statement in comparison with the
statement of the previous month.
13Note that the value of the coeﬃcient of the code statement variable cannot be interpretable econom-
ically since we have used changes in short-term interest rates but also from the opposites of changes in
prices of contracts on long-term interest rates, bearing in mind that all data are centered and reduced.
13The estimation is presented in appendix 2, table 5. Now, the correlation between the
ﬁrst axis derived from the PCA and the change in the tone of the statement between two
ECB meetings appears clearly. Our statement code variable in diﬀerence is far more signif-
icant and this variable allows us to explain far better our main component of short-term
interest rates and long-term interest rates. The coeﬃcient of the variable remains positive :
thus, if the statement becomes more hawkish, euro interest rates tend to rise and, vice-
versa, if the statement moves from hawkish to neutral, or from neutral to dovish, interest
rates will then trend downwards. The markets do not react so much to the statement in
absolute terms as to changes in the statement. Thus, if the statement is hawkish after
a monetary policy council and remains hawkish at the meeting of the following month,
the markets will hardly react. Conversely, when the statement changes and moves from
hawkish (code +1) to very hawkish (code +2), the markets react far more. The manner
in which ECB statements move at its monthly press conference allows us to explain more
than 31% of moves in interest rates recorded on the day of the ECB meeting14.
PCA analysis returns several factors decreasingly ordered by variance proportion. Our
ﬁrst factor explains 52% of the whole variance of short- and long-term rates in euro zone.
We concluded that changes of the tone of ECB statements aﬀects this ﬁrst axis. We now
turn to the question whether the second PCA factor is aﬀected or not by the tone of ECB
statements. This question is all the more interesting that the second PCA axis corresponds
to the slope15 of the yield curve (it explains 32% of the variance of all the changes in short-
and long-term interest rates) . The estimation is presented in appendix 2 (table 6). It re-
veals that the tone of statements has no eﬀect at all on the slope of the yield curve, which
is consistent with our previous results (we ﬁnd indeed that statements have a simultaneous
eﬀect on both short- and long-term rates.). To conﬁrm this, we use the same methodology
to ﬁne-tune our analysis of the impact of statements on euro-zone short-term interest rates
14When we observe the estimation graphically, however, we can see a small lag during 2001 between
trends in interest rates and the tone of statements. Note that as soon as early 2001, the markets were
expecting a rate cut by the ECB. Nevertheless, the ECB did not change its key interest rate in February,
March, or even in April 2001, whereas the economic slowdown seemed to justify a rate cut (inﬂation was
admittedly still high despite the fall in oil prices and was picking up again in March-April but this was
mainly the result of the mad cow disease, i.e. an external supply shock). Even as the markets were banking
on a rate cut, the ECB’s statements remained neutral. The fact that its statements did not change from
one month to the next should not have led to ﬂuctuations in interest rates and yet they were trending
downwards : at this point in time, the markets believed in economic indicators more than in the ECB. In
fact, it eased its monetary policy in May, thus comforting the markets, while still making rather neutral
statements, as inﬂation had precisely peaked in this month at its highest level since the launch of the EMU
at 3.1% (but 3.4% according to its measure at the time, which was subsequently revised).
15The slope of the yield curve is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between long term rates and short term rates.
14(1M Euribor, 3M Euribor, 6M Euribor, 12M Euribor) before doing the same for long-term
interest rates.
5.1.2 What is the impact of statements on short-term interest rates?
When we carry out a Principal Component Analysis of euro-zone short-term interest rates,
we obtain a ﬁrst factor that allows us to explain about 78% of the information found in
the initial series. This factor corresponds, depending on the correlation, to a virtually
equiweighted average of all short-term interest rates.
Once again, we ﬁnd that the statement code variable (in diﬀerence) is very signiﬁcant
(see appendix 3, table 7) and is allocated a positive coeﬃcient, compatible with the previ-
ous results. Lastly, the day of the ECB meeting, the statement allows us to explain 27%
of the change in short-term interest rates (more precisely, 27% of 78% of the information
common to all short-term interest rates).
5.1.3 What is the impact of statements on long-term interest rates?
We now want to analyze the impact of the ECB’s press conferences on the euro-zone’s
long-term interest rates that we represent by the Schatz, Bobl and Bund contracts. We
therefore carry out a Principal Component Analysis of the diﬀerentials of the two-year,
ﬁve-year and ten-year euro zone contracts. The ﬁrst factor we obtain this time on its
own allows us to explain 92% of the variance of the three contracts and represents the
information (with very similar correlations ranging between 0.56 and 0.59) common to the
contracts. As previously, we regress this ﬁrst component on our statement code variable in
diﬀerence (see appendix 3, table 7).
Lastly, our variable statement code that codiﬁes the ECB’s statements allows us to ex-
plain 11% of the change in long-term interest rates (or more precisely, 11% of 92% of the
information contained in the Schatz, Bobl and Bund contracts). According to the fore-
going, the ECB’s statements, and more precisely changes in the tone of the statement
made after the press conference that follows the monetary policy council meeting plays a
signiﬁcant role in moves in short- and long-term interest rates in the euro zone. Thus, we
have shown that the statements could explain up to 27% of the ﬂuctuations in short-term
interest rates and about 11% of the ﬂuctuations in long-term interest rates. Consequently,
the short end of the yield curve reacts more noticeably to the contents of the statement
than the longer end, represented here by the Schatz, Bobl and Bund contracts.
155.1.4 Diﬀerentiated impact of statements according to the maturity of interest
rates
After using the principal component analysis to study the impact of the press conferences
of the ECB on short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates and interest rates consid-
ered overall, we complete this analysis by studying separately the eﬀect of our statement
variable on interest rates at diﬀerent maturities. We have already shown that the state-
ments had a more pronounced impact on the group of short-term interest rates than on
the group of long-term interest rates. Now, we will look for the horizon (among short-term
interest rates) for which the statements have the greatest impact. The results of various
regressions are shown in appendix 4 (table 8).
The estimations conﬁrm the role played by the change in the tone of ECB statements :
thus, our variable that codiﬁes the statement is always signiﬁcant and its coeﬃcient is
positive : when the statement becomes more hawkish, the interest rates of the yield curve
rise. Conversely, it can be seen that the statements seem to have a maximum eﬀect on
interest rates with a maturity ranging between six months and twelve months. Beyond
one year, the eﬀect of statements fades. Here, the result is quite surprising insofar as the
statements would apparently have a greater impact on 5- and 10-year interest rates (Bobl
and Bund contracts) than on 2-year interest rates (Schatz).
5.2 Non parametric statistics
In this section, we present another methodology of the impact of ECB communication
on market interest rates using non-parametric tests. Non-parametric tests are often used
in place of their parametric counterparts when certain assumptions about the underlying
population are questionable. They may be, and often are, more powerful in detecting pop-
ulation diﬀerences when certain assumptions are not satisﬁed : they can be done without
the assumption of normality (that is why they are very appropriate when the sample sizes
are small). Non-parametric statistics use "ordinal" data. These data are obtained by tak-
ing the raw data and giving each sample a rank. These ranks are then used to create test
statistics. In non parametric statistics, one deals with the median rather than the mean.
Since a mean can be easily inﬂuenced by outliers or skewness, and we are not assuming
normality, a mean no longer makes sense. The median is another judge of location, which
makes more sense in non parametric statistics. The median is considered the center of the
distribution.
16Tables 9 and 10 in appendix 5 present the mean and the median of our series (in ﬁrst
diﬀerence). We can see a strong relationship between our statement code variable in dif-
ference (∆ DECB, which reﬂects the change in the ECB’s statement in comparison with
the statement of the previous month) and the diﬀerence between market interest rates
on the day and on the day before of the monetary policy council meeting. If the ECB
statement becomes more hawkish, market interest rates tend to rise and if the statement
becomes more dovish, market interest rates will then trend downwards. Nevertheless, when
the tone of the ECB statement remains the same between two months, the relationship is
more variable. We will then test for a diﬀerence between the three subgroups.
We employ a methodology used by Clare & Courtenay (2001) by splitting the sample
period into days when the ECB statement becomes more hawkish or more dovish. We use
the split between more dovish or more hawkish days to investigate the pattern of mar-
ket reactions to ECB statements. Our sample is divided in three subgroups : ﬁrst, days
when the tone of the ECB statement becomes more hawkish (∆ DECB = +1) and the
opposite case when the ECB statement becomes more dovish (∆ DECB =- 1 ) . T h el a s t
subgroup contains days when the tone of the statement remains the same between two
consecutive monetary policy meetings (∆ DECB = 0). The diﬀerences in market reactions
to ECB statements between days where the tone of ECB statement becomes more hawkish
or more dovish are tested using a non-parametric statistic. The non parametric test which









− 3(N +1 ) (4)
where K = 3 since there are three subgroups (∆ DECB =+ 1 ,∆ DECB =0 ,∆ DECB =- 1 )
in our sample ; nk is the number of observations from series k and R =
ni
i=1 ri,k is the
rank sum for series k. This test statistic is distributed χ2 (K−1) under the null hypothesis
of equal medians.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test to assess the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between
more hawkish, more dovish or neutral days are given in table 11, appendix 6. They indicate
that the test for equality failed : we reject the null hypothesis for all market interest rates
(except for one-month Euribor rate). The medians of the three subgroups diﬀer. These
results conﬁrm our previous conclusion : the reaction of market interest rates depend
17on the change in the ECB’s statement in comparison with the statement of the previous
month. We can now present a more precise analysis by running the non-parametric test for
only two series, that is to say we want to compare the medians between two subgroups only.
We perform now the same test, but our objective is to test the equality of medians between
two subsamples. The results are given in table 12. We calculate the Kruskal-Wallis statis-
tic by using ﬁrst the split between more hawkish versus more dovish days (∆ DECB =1
versus ∆ DECB = -1 in the ﬁrst column). In the second column, we present the H statis-
tic who tests the equality of medians for days when the ECB’s statement becomes more
hawkish with days when the tone statement does not change in comparison with the tone
of the last month (∆ DECB =1versus ∆ DECB = 0). Lastly, the third column reports
the Kruskal-Wallis statistic to asses the diﬀerence in medians between days when the tone
of the ECB’s statement becomes more dovish with days when the tone remains the same
between two consecutive months (∆ DECB =- 1versus ∆ DECB = 0). For the two ﬁrst
columns, we can clearly conclude that market interest rates react diﬀerently, depending of
the change in the ECB’s statement tone. However, we can not reject the null hypothesis
between the last two subgroups (column three).
We conclude from these results that ﬁnancial markets are much more sensitive (and conse-
quently react more) when the tone of ECB statements is more hawkish. On the contrary,
market interest rates don not react so strongly when the tone of ECB statements is less
hawkish (or more accommodating). This result seems logical. Financial markets are in-
terested in the contents of the speech delivered by the BCE the day when the Governing
council meets : if the tone of ECB in comparison to the tone of the previous month be-
comes more hawkish, then market interest rates react more strongly (insofar as inﬂation
is the objective of the ECB’s monetary policy) than when the tone of the speech becomes
accommodating.
6 Conclusion
Communication policy of central banks is therefore fundamental in terms of explaining
moves in interest rates, around ECB meetings but also more generally speaking. Antici-
pating short-term moves in interest rates between the day before a meeting of the ECB’s
Governing Council and the day of the meeting (closing price) supposes predicting not only
changes in intervention rates but also the tone of the ECB’s statement (in addition to
18other possible determinants such as US data for example). Our results suggest that ECB
communication on meeting days (press conferences delivered after the announcement of
monetary policy decision) signiﬁcantly inﬂuences expectations of future monetary policy.
Hence the importance of the ex ante information about this statement, notably via inter-
views in the press of Council members (and the importance of "rumors" or "leaks"). Hence
also the introduction of a degree of subjectivity, in the interpretation of the words of the
Governor or the Sub-governor. Of course, the impact of monetary policy communication
has to be judged in the light of other news events, which can have a much larger eﬀect on
the market, such as international developments, domestic macroeconomic data releases ...
In the United States, communication of the Fed particularly steered long-term rates these
last months. Several speeches of Fed’s governors, such as Bernanke (2004a), Bernanke
(2004b) or Kohn (2005) emphasize the role of central bank communication for the eﬀec-
tiveness of monetary policy. As evidence that communication policy is a work in progress,
the FOMC has recently shifted its views in favor of expediting the release of its minutes.
The Committee unanimously decided on December 14, 2004 to expedite the release of the
minutes of each of its regularly scheduled meetings by issuing them three weeks after the
date of the policy decision16.
Certainly, ﬁnancial markets are today able to predict monetary policy decisions on key
interest rates fairly accurately. Nevertheless, central banks could become more transpar-
ent and increase their eﬀorts to communicate their views about the economic outlook and
its implications for monetary policy. By helping ﬁnancial markets to anticipate the future
level of monetary policy rate, monetary authorities will exercise more inﬂuence on long
rates. Can nevertheless central bank transparency go too far ? This is the question asked
by Mishkin (2004). In his paper, Mishkin argues that some suggestions for increased trans-
parency (particularly a central bank announcement of its objective function or projections
of the path of the policy interest rate) will complicate the communication process and
weaken support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives. Transparency can indeed
go too far ...
16The previous practice had been to release the minutes of a regularly scheduled meeting on the Thursday
following the subsequent regularly scheduled meeting.
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Table 2: Distribution of statement variable
20Date Statement variable Date Statement variable
7j a n9 9 0 8n o v0 1 -1
4f e b9 9 -1 6d e c0 1 0
4m a r9 9 -1 3j a n0 2 0
8a p r9 9 -1 7f e b0 2 0
6m a y9 9 -1 7m a r0 2 0
2j u n9 9 0 4a p r0 2 0
15 jul 99 0 2m a y0 2 1
9s e p9 9 1 6j u n0 2 1
7o c t9 9 1 4j u l0 2 1
4n o v9 9 1 12 sep 02 0
2d e c9 9 1 10 oct 02 0
5j a n0 0 1 7n o v0 2 -1
3f e b0 0 1 5d e c0 2 -1
2m a r0 0 2 9j a n0 3 -1
30 mar 00 2 6f e b0 3 -1
13 apr 00 2 6m a r0 3 -1
11 may 00 2 3a p r0 3 -1
8j u n0 0 2 8m a y0 3 -1
6j u l0 0 2 5j u n0 3 -1
14 sep 00 2 10 jul 03 -1
5o c t0 0 2 4s e p0 3 -1
19 oct 00 2 2o c t0 3 0
2n o v0 0 2 6n o v0 3 1
14 dec 00 1 4d e c0 3 1
1f e b0 1 1 8j a n0 4 1
1m a r0 1 0 5f e b0 4 1
11 apr 01 0 4m a r0 4 1
10 may 01 0 1a p r0 4 1
7j u n0 1 0 6m a y0 4 1
21 jun 01 0 3j u n0 4 1
5j u l0 1 0 1j u l0 4 1
30 aug 01 0 2s e p0 4 1
11 oct 01 0 7o c t0 4 1
Table 3: Codes given to ECB’s statements
21Appendix 2 : Estimation of the relationship between the ﬁrst and
second factor and the tone of the ECB statement
PC
st, lt
1 = α + βD ECB + ε (5)
with st,lt standing for short-term (st) and for long-term interest rates (lt)a n dPC 1 for
the ﬁrst factor derived from the Principal Components Analysis (PCA).
α t-Stat β t-Stat R2
PC
st,lt
1 -0.23 -0.95 0.57 2.51* 0.09
Table 4: Estimation via OLS
PC
st, lt
1 = α + β ∆ DECB + ε (6)
where ∆ DECB denotes change in the ECB’s statement in comparison with the statement
of the previous month.
α t-Stat β t-Stat R2
PC
st,lt
1 (52%) -0.021 -0.108 2.388 5.321*** 0.31
Table 5: Estimation of the ﬁrst PCA factor
PC
st, lt
2 = α + β ∆ DECB + ε (7)
* = Signiﬁcance at the 90% level
α t-Stat β t-Stat R2
PC
st,lt
2 (32%) 0.003 0.018 -0.271 -0.636 0.006
Table 6: Estimation of the second PCA factor
** = Signiﬁcance at the 95% level
*** = Signiﬁcance at the 99% level




i = α + β ∆ DECB + εi =1 ,2 j = st,lt (8)
where PC i denotes the i-th principal component with st standing for short-term interest
rates and lt standing for long-term interest rates.
α t-Stat β t-Stat R2
PC st
1 (78 %) -0.01 -0.099 2.06 4.8*** 0.27
PC st
2 (17 %) 0.006 0.066 0.302 1.295 0.025
PC lt
1 (92 %) -0.01 -0.0542 1.225 2.74* 0.11
Table 7: Estimation of the ﬁrst and second PCA factors for short term rates and of the
ﬁrst PCA factor for long term rates via OLS
* = Signiﬁcance at the 90% level
** = Signiﬁcance at the 95% level
*** = Signiﬁcance at the 99% level
23Appendix 4 : Diﬀerentiated impact of statements according to the
maturity of interest rates
∆ Rt = α + β ∆ DECB + εt (9)
where ∆ Rt is the change in rate between the day before the ECB meeting and the
day of the meeting, all data being centered and reduced. As regards long rates, we use
contracts and thus the change in price with the opposite sign.
Market interest rates α t-Stat β t-Stat R2
1m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.01 -0.12 0.76 2.87* 0.11
3m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.01 -0.1 0.97 3.83** 0.19
6m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.003 -0.03 1.16 4.86*** 0.27
12 month Euribor -0.008 -0.076 1.22 4.95*** 0.29
(-) Schatz (2 year) 0.01 0.01 0.575 2.11* 0.07
(-) Bobl (5 year) -0.06 -0.05 0.76 2.88* 0.12
(-) Bund (10 year) -0.01 -0.11 0.76 2.88* 0.12
Table 8: Regressions results for various maturities.
24Appendix 5 : Descriptive statistics for market interest rates in euro
zone
∆ DECB = −1 ∆ DECB =0 ∆ DECB =1
1m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.032 -0.005 0.002
3m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.024 -0.003 0.006
6m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.021 -0.002 0.018
12 month Euribor -0.023 -0.002 0.044
2-year -0.009 0.031 0.146
5-year -0.031 0.029 0.371
10-year -0.092 0.046 0.487
Table 9: Mean of series (ﬁrst diﬀerence)
∆ DECB = −1 ∆ DECB =0 ∆ DECB =1
1m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.004 -0.002 0.000
3m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.014 -0.002 0.002
6m o n t hE u r i b o r -0.019 -0.003 0.009
12 month Euribor -0.021 -0.0005 0.018
2-year 0.004 0.0047 0.164
5-year -0.029 0.0096 0.427
10-year -0.096 0.063 0.494
Table 10: Medians of series (ﬁrst diﬀerence)
25Appendix 6: Non-parametric tests
Kruskal-Wallis statistic P-value
1 month Euribor 3.731 0.153
3 month Euribor 8.305 0.015**
6 month Euribor 13.424 0.001***




Table 11: Test for equality of medians between the three subgroups
∆ DECB =1 /-1 ∆ DECB =1 /0 ∆ DECB =0 /-1
1 month Euribor 2.46 0.116 3.05 0.081* 0.49 0.482
3 month Euribor 5.22 0.022** 6.05 0.013** 1.93 0.164
6 month Euribor 6.61 0.010*** 9.65 0.001** 3.86 0.049**
12 month Euribor 9.00 0.002*** 11.87 0.000*** 3.47 0.062***
2-year 4.59 0.032** 6.05 0.013** 0.06 0.798
5-year 5.22 0.022** 9.28 0.002*** 0.26 0.609
10-year 4.59 0.032** 8.044 0.004*** 0.62 0.428
Table 12: Test for equality of medians between two subgroups (Kruskal-Wallis statistic
and P-value)
* = Signiﬁcance at the 90% level
** = Signiﬁcance at the 95% level
*** = Signiﬁcance at the 99% level
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